In recent years, academic economists have come to appreciate the centrality of public institutions in contributing to economic performance. Yet Korea, arguably the premier success story of the last half-century, has sometimes been described as a First World economy with Third World institutions. Although Korea modestly underachieves on most of the 52 institutional indicators examined in this paper, it is not an outlier, and on most indicators it is converging on global norms from below.
Korea is arguably the premier development success story of the last half-century. Despite this success, there has been a nagging sense among many observers that the development of Korea's economic and political institutions has not kept pace with the breakneck tempo of economic growth. Now, ten years after the 1997-98 crisis, coinciding with an electoral shift to the center-right, is an opportune time to take stock of the progress made over the past decade. The country's institutional development has relevance beyond the specific case of Korea: The importance of institutions versus other factors is subject to considerable dispute in development economics literature, and whether Korea, the development exemplar, conforms to the "institutions rule" notion is of broader intellectual interest (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004; Glaeser et al. 2004; Jones and Olken 2005) .
To address these questions, this paper exploits the growing body of quantitative data on To preview the conclusions, improvements in Korea's political and economic institutions over the past decade have outstripped the country's "First World economy, Third World politics" image. While the data are noisy, and Korea generally underperforms modestly relative to its level of per capita income, the country is not an outlier, and on most indicators Korea is converging on global norms. However, it would be hard to argue on the basis of this analysis that institutional development has led economic growth in Korea.
KOREAN PERFORMANCE

Koreans have high expectations about what the public sector can deliver. In the 2007-08 World
Economic Forum survey (as in those of prior years), local business executives identified "policy instability" and "inefficient bureaucracy" as the two biggest problems in doing business in Korea, followed by tax rates and factor-market rigidities (figure 1). At the other extreme, infrastructure, labor quality, and crime and theft are the least of their concerns. In other words, in this self-assessment, the country does well in terms of provision of basic inputs-labor and capital-but poorly in the political economy of their management. Table 1 places Korea in comparative relief, reporting Korea's percentile rankings on institutional indicators from the four sources calculated for a consistent 44-country sample. The higher the percentile ranking, the better Korea performed relative to the comparator countries sampled for this paper. For some indicators, such as corruption, we report multiple variants derived from different sources as an implicit check on the robustness of the exercise.
We examine first and last year data for each indicator in order to gauge the degree of improvement in various aspects of institutional quality and competitiveness. Unfortunately, the beginning and ending Of less consequence is the difference in ending years. Differences in the beginning year may be more problematic. World Governance Indicators and Corruption Perceptions Index data both begin in 1996, prior to the Asian financial crisis, whereas World Competitiveness Yearbook data begin in 1998 at the height of Korea's financial crisis. While there may have been very little fundamental change in institutional quality or competitiveness in certain dimensions over this period, a massive economic crisis could certainly have an adverse effect on perceptions of Korean institutions. This caveat must be considered where large absolute or relative improvements in Korea's scores are observed. Table 1 reports rankings for 1996 and 1998, the two starting years of the sample, and for 2006 and 2007 and also the change in rankings over this period. A higher number indicates stronger performance on that criterion. As the left panel shows, at the outset all of Korea's scores were below the mean, and more than half were in the lowest quartile. Despite its reputation in some quarters, Korea did relatively well on the corruption indices, with scores ranging from 32 to 41-not good but far better than the multiple indices on which it was in the lowest decile.
The right panel reports results for 2006-07, as well as the change in rankings. Korea scored at or above the mean in 18 of 52 categories, though this improvement may be exaggerated somewhat by the inclusion of the Global Competitiveness Report data, in which Korea tends to do fairly well. Korea's rankings improved in the vast majority of categories, with double-digit improvements on bureaucracy (20 places), personal security and private property (13 places), government decisions (11 places), and political parties (10 places). On the corruption rankings, for example, the range rose from 32 to 41 percent at the beginning of the sample period and from 34 to 48 percent at its end-still below the mean but an improvement.
One conundrum is that local conditions may be improving in an absolute sense (which local residents may observe and appreciate), but the country could still be falling behind in relative termswhich may be the relevant criterion for other actors, say, international investors. In figures 2 to 6, the data are reorganized into five broad categories (Governance and Corruption, Political Institutions, Domestic Business Institutions, International Business Institutions, and Societal Institutions), and standardized scores (taking into account the cross-country dispersion of the individual indices) are graphed.
1 The southwest quadrant indicates performance below the mean in both the starting and terminal years of the sample; the northwest quadrant depicts below-average performance at the start and above-average performance at the end. In the case of Korea, the other two quadrants are empty. Observations above the 45 degree line signal improvement; below it means deterioration. The data on domestic business institutions show yet more dispersion, with the price controls indicator being more than two standard deviations below the mean (a crude indicator of a truly outlying observation) in 1998 (figure 4). Four of the five indicators are above the 45 degree line, the sole exception being the critical indicator of labor relations, though in this case it is so close to the line that the apparent deterioration in relative performance may not be statistically significant.
Korea exhibits the most outlying behavior with respect to international business institutions, where three of the eight indicators are more than two standard deviations below the mean at the beginning of 1. Scores are standardized by subtracting the mean from the observed score for each year and dividing this difference by the standard deviation of scores for that year.
the sample period (figure 5). Perhaps driven by the reforms undertaken in the wake of the crisis, all of the international business institution indicators show improvement, falling above the 45 degree line.
In the final tranche of indicators, societal institutions, three of the four indicators show improvement, with one, personal property and personal security, landing in the northwest quadrant, indicating better than average performance at the end of the sample period. Conversely, the worst performance was on the discrimination indicator, where Korea's performance was below the norm at the start and then deteriorated further.
INCOME AND CONVERGENCE
Thus far we have examined Korea's status without any reference to its level of development or that of its comparators. It is evident from cross-national data that the quality of institutions increases with income;
what is more controversial is whether this relationship is causal. One possibility is that good institutions lead to good performance. The other is that with rising incomes, governments come under both internal and external pressure to improve institutions and practices.
To get a sense of how Korea stacks up in these surveys, in For each of the five institutional baskets, on average, Korea's institutions are most similar to countries that are poorer than it is. There are exceptions: Korea's "neighbors" with respect to personal security and private property, for example, are significantly richer than it is in both the starting and ending years of the sample period and by an increasing margin, as the ratio of per capita incomes rises from 1.22 to 1.58.
However, Korea does not appear to gravitate toward higher-income neighbors in general. A significant average increase in the per capita income ratio in governance and corruption is offset by a decline with respect to international business institutions.
This analysis can be made more rigorous by regressing per capita income on each of the institutional indicators. 2 The estimated regression for the first indicator, Transparency International's 2. Figures 8 to 12, which correspond to the regression analysis, display South Korea's studentized residuals from cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions for every year and indicator. In each simple regression, the level score for each institutional indicator is regressed on the log of per capita income, effectively creating a crude form of per capita income control. The residuals Corruption Perceptions Index, for the terminal year of the sample period, 2007, is displayed in figure   7 . The estimated regression indicates that a 1 percent increase in purchasing power-adjusted per capita income is associated with a 0.57 percent improvement in the Corruption Perceptions Index. In this particular case, the Korean observation lies below the regression line, indicating that Korea has a higherthan-expected perception of corruption (i.e., a lower Corruption Perceptions Index score) than would be expected on the basis of its income level.
In figures 8 to 12, we report the Korean studentized residuals from similar regressions on each institutional indicator for each year, organized by the five baskets. (The studentized residual can be interpreted as the t-statistic associated with a dummy variable added to the regression for that particular observation. As a rule of thumb, a studentized residual exceeding 2.0 in absolute value is notable [Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980] .) So, for example, in the case of governance and corruption (figure 8 However, in figure 11 on international business institutions, the magnitudes of the studentized residuals are generally larger, and evidence of improvement over time is less obvious. There is a dramatic improvement in the protectionism residual, even if it remains negative throughout the sample period.
Nevertheless, by the end of the sample period, all seven indicators are within rule-of-thumb margin of tolerance.
Finally, figure 12 shows Korea's residuals for societal institutions. Korea generally does better than expected on personal security and private property, though not by a significant margin. The country fares relatively poorly on the discrimination indicator that "discrimination with respect to race, gender, age, etc. does not hinder economic development."
are then studentized to allow for comparison across institutional indicators, since they are originally scored on different scales and therefore not readily comparable without some form of standardization. Per capita income is measured in purchasing power terms as reported in the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook database.
CONCLUSION
In recent years academic economists have come to appreciate the centrality of public institutions in contributing to economic performance. Yet Korea, arguably the premier success story of the last halfcentury, has sometimes been described as a First World economy with Third World institutions.
Although Korea modestly underachieves on most of the 52 criteria examined in this paper, it is not an outlier, and on most indicators it is converging on global norms from below. However, it would be difficult to argue narrowly on the basis of this analysis that institutional development led economic growth. Institutions do not appear to rule, at least in Korea. Labour Organisation, has been, and remains, weak. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which Korea joined in 1996, has been at the forefront of anticorruption activities but has no enforcement power. In the area of competition policy, there has been little consensus about desirable practices, and really no international organization (except perhaps the OECD) has addressed these issues.
Perhaps it is not surprising then that Korea has made great progress on protectionism (admittedly from a low base made possible by the lack of enforcement power in the WTO's forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the "special and differential" provisions that made commitments by developing countries nonbinding). Arguably the next best performance has been in financial reform and issues relating to investment and probably the worst in the largely "domestic" arenas of competition and labor policy. The reason is straightforward: The existence of international norms gives policymakers a goal to aim for, and the existence of international institutions (and other avenues of international diplomatic pressure) helps in overcoming the historical weakness and parochialism of Korean public institutions. Comparability issues within and across sources can occur contemporaneously between countries, within countries over time, and by extension between countries over time. Contemporaneous inconsistencies between countries can arise due to standardization issues; a single respondent cannot know everything about his relative position in the world, so it is difficult to ensure cross-country consistency of standards. GCR and WCY, both of which gather data on institutional competitiveness of a host economy through executive opinion surveys, address cross-country standardization by selecting participants 1. Perceptions may vary between managers operating in different economic sectors, so data collection agencies such as IMD and WEF collecting primary data from executive surveys must ensure that they obtain a broadly representative sample of managers. The most recent iteration of the WCY survey was completed by 3,700 executives from 55 economies, and the GCR survey was completed by 11,000 executives in 131 economies (Rosselet-McCauley 2007 , WEF 2007 . Both surveys ask respondents to judge local conditions relative to a global best practices benchmark on an ordinal scale. GCR records and reports these results on a scale from 1 to 7; WCY has executives rank conditions on a scale of 1 to 6 and converts these scores to a 1 to 10 scale for reporting. The WEF and its network of affiliates attempt to get a cross-section of respondents from firms of differing sizes across a range of activities, tapping partner affiliate institutes to ensure that a relatively heterogeneous sample is selected across countries (WEF 2007) . The IMD takes a similar approach, capturing the opinions of upper and middle management from both domestic and multinational firms across a broad range of economic sectors that operate internationally. These managers are asked to evaluate conditions within their host economy from an international perspective. A potential weakness of this approach is that the respondents may not know enough about the best practices to meaningfully compare with local circumstances. Respondents to survey questionnaires will by necessity change over time due to expanding samples, staff changes at the firms and organizations being surveyed, and a variety of other reasons. To address this issue, the IMD encourages alumni to participate in each sequential survey (Rosselet-McCauley 2007) . For our purposes, time inconsistencies as they may exist are irrelevant in the case of GCR because we examine only a single year of data from this source.
2. WGI examines six distinct aggregate indicators of governance composed of data from 33 sources provided by 30 independent organizations, and CPI aggregates data from 14 sources provided by 12 independent organizations into a single measure of perceptions of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007; Lambsdorff 2007) . CPI incorporates data from the past two years in order to mitigate abrupt random shifts in a country's CPI score (Lambsdorff 2007 , WEF 2007 ). WCY's single-year survey does not incorporate lags and is more susceptible to random shifts in perceptions but has the advantage of being more immediately responsive to real changes in the quality of public institutions.
that operate in an international capacity. Aggregate measures, which take a wider range of data into account, should help to smooth this effect over, but different sources also apply different aggregation and standardization methodologies when creating composite institutional indicators.
Scoring methodology differs between sources. As mentioned earlier, CPI and GCR scores consist of information from the current and previous years. CPI standardizes data from individual sources using a matching percentiles technique to normalize scores and applies a beta transformation to prevent convergence in country scores over time, then averages these individual data inputs to calculate a CPI value for each country (Lambsdorff 2007) . 3 WGI aggregates are calculated using an unobserved components model (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007) . WCY scores are country-level averages of executive responses to the WCY executive opinion survey, whereas GCR applies a slightly more nuanced, weighted, and time-discounted two-year moving average to score the results of the GCR executive opinion survey. Country samples, data samples, and respondents may change in the data from year to year, and individual perceptions may lag real institutional changes on the ground, introducing time inconsistencies into the data. Countries may also enter or exit from a dataset over time, rendering changes in percentile rankings meaningless. A changing country sample can be addressed directly by limiting the number of countries to those with complete data. Some of the sources report data for larger country samples, but for the sake of comparability we report the rankings on a consistent sample basis. Adding relatively small poor countries to the sample will tend to improve Korea's rankings.
In their most recent versions, the WGI research project compares 212 countries and territories, CPI covers 180 countries, GCR covers 131 economies, and WCY covers 55 economies. Between these four sources, we obtained a common set of 44 countries for examination in this study: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
Once the underlying methodological differences between sources are accounted for, comparing scores across sources is simple. Individual country scores for each indicator are standardized by differencing each country's score by the mean and then normalizing this difference by the indicator's standard deviation. Countries are also ranked across a consistent sample to help detect relative improvements against a group of comparator countries.
3. A consequence of matching percentiles is that it reduces the standard deviation of individual scores. The beta transformation remedies this by widening the standard deviation (Lambsdorff 2007) .
A final issue to consider is that these sources are not entirely independent from one another. Both CPI's and WGI's aggregate measures of governance and corruption incorporate data from both GCR and WCY, meaning that their apparent consistency may be illusory. Conversely, divergences might signal fragility in these indices. 
